Since the 1970s and especially during the last decade several countries experienced a process of decentralization of the public sector, while at the same time the integration of the world economy is rapidly progressing. This parallelism becomes even more evident with regard to European Union countries. Given this background, the paper examines the impact of economic and political integration on the vertical government structure. By increasing the market size and the benefits of local provision of public goods and taxes, economic integration, and particularly integration among European Union countries, could have triggered the recent process of decentralization. Drawing on recent work on fiscal federalism, the secession of countries, and new economic geography, the role of integration is investigated for a panel of OECD countries. The empirical analysis relates public sector centralization to economic and European integration, controlling for other determinants, such as inter-regional heterogeneity, economies of scale and institutions, and including fixed country effects. The results found are in fact consistent with a strong decentralizing effect of both economic and European integration.
Introduction
Since the 1970s and especially during the last decade several industrial and developing countries, and, more recently, the East European transformation countries, experienced a more or less pronounced process of decentralization of the public sector. At the same time, the globalization and integration of the world economy is rapidly progressing. This parallelism becomes even more evident with regard to European Union countries. In the course of economic and political integration, fiscal and political powers have been transferred from the national governments both to the European Union and to lower levels of government. This development is often associated with a rise of the regional level of government -the so-called "New Regionalism" and the "Europe of the Regions" -Spain, Belgium, Italy, France, and, more recently, the United Kingdom, being the most prominent examples. According to this, the national level of government increasingly proves to be too small in terms of influence to cope with globalization, and too large to deal with local or regional necessities, and is thus expected to be further pushed back.
Given this background, this paper adresses the general question whether economic and political integration fosters the decentralization of the public sector. According to the traditional literature on fiscal federalism (Oates, 1972 , Musgrave, 1959 , the optimal degree of centralization of the public sector is determined by the cost and benefits of the decentral provision of public goods. On the one hand, decentralization allows for the differentiation of public goods according to local preferences and conditions. On the other hand, it implies cost in form of inter-jurisdictional spillovers and foregone economies of scale. However, recent work on fiscal federalism has shown that political decision-making processes in democracies and the underlying institutional rules also have to be taken into account. Against the background of increasing globalization and secessionist tendencies, new approaches (Alesina and Spolaore, 1997, Bolton and Roland, 1997) investigate the impact of economic integration on the creation and disintegration of countries. Accordingly, economic integration increases the size of the market and reduces the cost of independence, thus increasing the benefits of secession or regional autonomy. However, there is only little empirical evidence on this issue, and, furthermore, the impact of both economic and political integration on the overall vertical structure of government has been hardly explored.
Starting with a theoretical framework which combines the traditional cost-benefit approach with institutional rules, this paper tries to develop further these reflections in order to explore the impact of both economic and political integration on the degree of centralization of the public sector. According to the new economic geography literature, economic integration generates agglomeration and specialization effects at the regional level, thus increasing the scope for economies of scale. Local governments could exploit these benefits by autonomously choosing local public goods and taxes in order to attract mobile factors. Political and monetary integration in Europe could even further reduce the cost of local autonomy, since certain policies are conducted or coordinated at the European level. However, decentralization could come at a cost, since integration and factor mobility may enhance the danger of harmful fiscal competition between local governments and increase the exposure to economic shocks. Furthermore, the institutional framework regulating the devolution of fiscal powers and the participation of lower levels of government in central decision-making could also play an important role.
These analytical considerations are applied to a panel of OECD countries for the period 1970-2000. The empirical analysis relates public sector centralization to the degree of economic and European integration and to other explanatory factors, such as interregional heterogeneity, economies of scale, and institutions. In order to focus on the role of integration, regressions with fixed country effects are performed, however allowing for interactions between time-invariant factors and integration. The results found are consistent with a strong decentralizing effect of both economic and European integration.
The paper proceeds as follows. The following section briefly surveys the basic theoretical literature on the determinants of the vertical government structure. Based upon this, the hypotheses concerning the impact of economic and political integration on the benefits and cost of decentralization are laid out in the next section. Section 4, then, presents some descriptive statisticts on OECD countries and provides the regression analysis. Finally, section 5 draws the conclusions and presents the prospects for future research.
Determinants of the vertical government structure
The starting point of the analysis of the division of functions between different layers of government is the literature on fiscal federalism in the tradition of Musgrave (1959) and Oates (1972) .
1 According to the welfare maximizing approach, the optimal allocation of functions between different layers of government depends upon the trade-off between the benefits of the decentral provision of public goods, which allows for differentiation according to local preferences and conditions, and the cost implied by inter-jurisdictional spillovers and foregone economies of scale (Decentralization Theorem). Consequently, national public goods, like defense, as well as income redistribution and macroeconomic stabilization should be provided by the central government, whereas local public goods should be within the competency of local governments. The optimal degree of centralization of the public sector depends both on the degree of inter-jurisdictional heterogeneity and the characteristics of public goods. Shifts in the allocation of functions are therefore either due to changes in local preferences and conditions, or in the relative demand for certain public goods. For example, international conflicts raise the demand for security and military protection, thus increasing the role of the central government. However, these considerations hinge on the crucial assumptions of a lack of coordination between local governments, and the uniform provision of public goods by the central government, which in general are not met in reality. Moreover, the cost-benefit approach neglects the role of elected policymakers, and the decision-making processes in democracies. As emphasized by the Leviathan literature 3 , decentralization leads to efficiency enhancing fiscal competition and constrains revenuemaximizing activities of governments. Within this context, Brennan and Buchanan (1980) refer to the danger of political cartels between local decision-makers in federal states. The common-pool-problem induced by the involvement of lower levels of government in central decision-making leads in the end to an extensive centralization of the public sector.
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Without considering the assumption of a Leviathan, recent work on fiscal federalism tries to integrate the traditional theory with political decision-making processes and the underlying institutional rules. Besley and Coate (2000) and Gradstein (2000) , among others 5 , show that apart from heterogeneity and spillovers, the benefits of centralization depend upon the involvement of local jurisdictions in national legislation. Without some constitutionally guaranteed participation in decision-making, especially smaller jurisdictions run the risk of being discriminated against by the national majority or powerful jurisdictions. According to this, central decision-making proves to be more attractive in countries with constitutionally guaranteed representation of their constituent juris-dictions.
6 Therefore, demands for decentralization or even secession are assumed to be stronger in countries with relatively high inter-jurisdictional heterogeneity and without appropriate representation of the subnational level in the legislative process. However, in contrast to this, inter-jurisdictional bargaining in central decision-making bear the common-pool-problem described above, thus increasing the inefficiency of centralization.
Another important institutional aspect concerns the way in which the allocation of functions at the different levels of government is determined. This can take place either through direct consultation of the citizens, simple parliamentary majority or constitutional changes. Crémer and Palfrey (1996) show that federal states, where the decision on centralization has to be approved by the majority of jurisdictions, are more centralized than unitary states, where national referenda take place. In contrast to this, Lockwood (2000) concludes that, provided that central provision of public goods allows for efficiency gains and local differentiation, federal states choose less centralization than unitary states. Furthermore, Lockwood (2002) shows that the decision on centralization and the degree of uniformity of public good provision depend on the extent of spillovers. Finally, Redoano and Scharf (2001) point out that in case of strong heterogeneity regional referenda lead to less centralization, as compared to negotiations between regional decision-makers in representative democracies.
To sum up, previous theoretical work has shown that preferences and technologies, as well as political institutions determine the degree of government centralization. Large inter-jurisdictional differences in preferences and conditions, and less demand for public goods with spillovers and economies of scale are expected to be associated with a lower level of overall centralization, whereas the influence of institutions depends on the specific provisions regulating the participation of local jurisdictions in national decision-making.
3 The impact of integration
Theoretical considerations
While explaining cross-country differences in the degree of centralization, the literature on fiscal federalism provides only insufficient interpretation of the recent trend towards decentralization in several countries. Inspired by increasing regional separatism and the emergence of new countries, recent papers explore the economic determinants of the creation and disintegration of countries.
7 In the tradition of the Decentralization Theorem, Alesina and Spolaore (1997) , and Bolton and Roland (1997) expound that a region's decision of leaving the nation-state or demanding more fiscal autonomy is driven by the trade-off between the provision of public goods and taxes in accordance with local preferences, and the cost of reduced coordination with the rest of the nation. Whereas the benefits of independence are determined by the extent of heterogeneity, efficiency cost consist in foregone economies of scale in the provision of public goods and technological and fiscal spillovers due to missing coordination of local policies and taxes. Majority decisions are shown to prevent the internalization of externalities associated with secession, the spread of democracy thus resulting in the emergence of an inefficiently large number of small countries.
However, endogeneous border changes represent an extreme case, which rather applies to historical "accidents" or to the local context. According to Bolton and Roland (1997) , regional autonomy implies less cost than secession, since it partly avoids the efficiency losses involved. In case of secession, new institutions and rules have to be set up, and income redistribution and formerly national public goods, such as defence or infrastructure have to be provided at a lower scale and with higher per-capita cost.
8 Furthermore, as Alesina and Perotti (1998) point out, staying within the nation-state provides the advantage of inter-regional risk-sharing and redistribution in case of asymmetric economic shocks.
9 But, with factor mobility, regional autonomy implies also cost in form of fiscal competition. Moreover, in contrast to the Tiebout world, factor mobility is claimed to exert a homogenizing effect on the distribution of regional income and preferences, thus favouring centralization.
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Going a step further, Alesina and Spolaore (1997) analyze the impact of economic integration on the creation of countries.
11 Whereas, in general, the degree of integration in the world economy plays no role for the benefits associated with public good provision according to local preferences, it affects the cost of independence. With significant barriers to trade and factor mobility, secession would imply high transaction cost in the economic relations with the rest of the nation and the world. In case of open economies, however, these cost are reduced, since national borders no longer delimit the size of the market.
12 Expanding market size facilitates economies of scale in the production, thus fostering economic and productivity growth. Therefore, economic integration is expected to increase the benefits of secession, or, respectively, fiscal and political autonomy. The intensification of separatist movements in Québec after creation of the NAFTA, and demands for regional autonomy in certain EU countries seem to illustrate these claims. In addition to this, Spolaore and Alesina (2001) show that the reduction in international conflicts and the enforcement of international law raise the benefits of secession. The end of the cold war could have reduced the necessity of military defence and security, thus decreasing the role of the central government in the 1990s. Within this context, regional autonomy movements are also more likely to be tolerated since they are no longer perceived as a threat to national security and integrity.
In order to assess the relationship between integration and the observed decentralization of the public sector, these reflections have to be developed further and applied analogously to the overall vertical structure of government. In reality, demands for secession concern only particular regions, and are often solved by specific agreements, such as home rules. Decentralization, in contrast, entails the devolution of fiscal competency to the lower levels of government as a whole.
13 Also, certain forms of inter-regional heterogeneity could be dealt with by granting cultural or political autonomy, or through central government block grants which allow for a differentiated provision of public goods. Therefore, a closer examination of the fiscal incentives generated by economic integration seems necessary.
In case of inter-regional heterogeneity of factor endowments, the market size effect of economic integration is expected to intensify regional specialization according to comparative advantages and to foster the inter-regional divison of labour. This development is further supported by technical progress which reduces transaction and transport cost and increases factor mobility and inter-jurisdictional knowledge spillovers. The new economic geography literature in the tradition of Krugman (1991) has shown that economic 8 In case of military defence, however, small countries can behave as free-riders and benefit from the military protection of large neighbouring countries or alliances. This is, e.g., the case of Austria and the NATO.
9 See also Tabellini (1996a, 1996b) on the trade-off between risk-sharing, and inter-personal redistribution and moral hazard.
10 This issue is also presented by , and Perroni and Scharf (2001) . 11 See also Alesina et al. (2000) , Alesina (2002) , and Casella and Feinstein (2002) , as well as Alesina and Wacziarg (1999) with regard to the European integration.
12 However, even in an integrated world, high transaction cost can still persist due to cultural or linguistic differences. 13 Spain presents an interesting exception, since the regions have different degrees of autonomy which are negotiated directly with the central government.
integration induces agglomeration effects in the industrial sector and leads to interregional specialization of the production structure.
14 Evidence for a causal relationship is found particularly for regions in the European Union.
15 Whereas per capita income of member countries converged, cross-regional disparities within countries increased.
However, these considerations have not yet become established in the theories on fiscal federalism and secession. Since local public goods which represent complementary factors of production, as well as taxes influence the location of mobile factors, they are expected to play an important role in the process of agglomeration and specialization at the regional level. As Krugman and Baldwin (2002) have recently shown, economic integration creates agglomeration rents for production factors located in the core which can be taxed away, thus preventing a race to the bottom in taxation. Extending this approach to public spending, Brakman et al. (2002) point out that taxes stimulate spreading of production factors, whereas public goods foster agglomeration by enhancing the attractiveness of the location for mobile firms and workers. However, the resulting implications for the vertical government structure are not taken into account by these papers. With increasing economic integration local and regional governments would benefit from extended fiscal autonomy which allows them to implement their own policies and compete for mobile factors of production. In the end, fiscal decentralization could trigger a process of repecussions intensifying industrial specialization and agglomeration. Since investors would benefit from fiscal competition and the implementation of market-conforming policies, economic interest groups are expected to support further decentralization of the public sector. In addition to this, local autonomy allows investors to exert more influence on local decision-making and to shape local policies.
On the other side, the benefits of decentralization could be counteracted by increased economic risk. Since economic opening is associated with higher exposure to exogenous shocks, the requirement of inter-personal income redistribution and risk-sharing across regions, and thus the role of the central government, is expected to rise.
16 Furthermore, cross-regional differences in preferences and income are increasing as a consequence of economic integration, regional specialization and structural change. Whereas well endowed regions could benefit from enlarged autonomy and fiscal competition which permits them to escape from the implicit inter-regional redistribution, poor unproductive regions would be reluctant to decentralization and demand instead higher central government subsidies and income redistribution.
17 Since economic integration strengthens the credibility of threats of secession, higher central government transfers could even be necessary to prevent rich regions from leaving.
In line with the fiscal federalism literature, apart from cost-benefit considerations, institutional rules underlying the decision-making processes are expected to influence the achievement of secession or decentralization. For instance, without the existance of rules regulating peaceful secessions, the cost of independence could be rather high, at worst taking the form of armed conflicts.
18 Also, the degree of regional involvement in central decision-making and legal provisions for the transfer of powers affect the implementation of demands for decentralization. Collusive behaviour of regional policy-makers or the opposition of poor regions in central decision-making could dampen the pressure for decentralization and fiscal competition induced by integration and increase instead inter-regional redistribution.
Finally, another important aspect neglected by the previous literature is the possible impact of political integration on the vertical government structure. On the one hand, political integration among countries entails a centralizing effect, since certain government functions are transferred to a higher level of government. On the other side, however, it could intensify the demands for decentralization or secession within the member countries.
19 As illustrates the case of the European Union, the cost of secession would be further reduced, since certain public goods and policies inherent to the central government are now provided by the supranational level or coordinated among the countries. This comprises, for example, the common trade and agriculture policies, regulation and market supervision, the environment policy, and most recently the monetary policy. Furthermore, the European Community is increasingly involved in regional development and infrastructure projects, and partly takes on certain insurance functions of the national governments.
In order to take the advantage of political integration, the secessionist regions are required to join the European Union. This case is not yet provided for in the European treaties, but could be rather questionable when taking into account that admission of new member countries has to be decided unanimously. In case of rejection, the political and economic price of staying outside the political union would be considerably higher as compared to the case of mere economic integration. Also, with increasing majoritarian decision-making in the European Council, small secessionist regions would possibly exert less influence on European policy-making as compared to forming part of a larger member country.
20 Therefore, regional autonomy and decentralization are expected to be preferred to secessionism in the context of European integration. Incentives for regionalism are also provided by certain European policies and institutions. Especially the European structural funds increasingly require regional implementation and planning, thus augmenting the scope for direct action of regional decision-makers and lobbying groups. Demands for extended local autonomy could be the consequence. In general, the European Commission seems to encourage the process of regionalisation in the member countries, probably in order to undermine the power of the national governments.
Empirical evidence
The theoretical discussion suggests that economic and political integration may contribute to the decentralization of the public sector. However, until now, only little and unsystematic empirical evidence has been provided with regard to the impact of integration on the vertical government structure. In general, most of the work deals with the determinants of the degree of centralization as derived from the theory on fiscal federalism, using cross-sectional analyses of industrial and developing countries.
21 In general, the results support the Decentralization Theorem. For example, Strumpf and Oberholzer-Gee (2002) demonstrate for the US states liquor policy a decentralizing effect of preference heterogeneity. Little evidence has also been provided for the role of institutional rules. Democracy and federal constitutions are found to be associated with less centralization. Schaltegger and Feld (2001) find a negative impact of referenda on the degree of centralization of Swiss cantons, which is explained by the direct control exercized by citizens on the government budget. However, these studies focus on the factors explaining cross-country differences in the degree of centralization, and pay no attention to the dynamic impact of economic or political integration on the cost and benefits of centralization.
In line with the literature on secessions, Alesina and Wacziarg (1998) provide evidence for a negative relationship between the size of the country and the degree of economic openness, thus confirming the hypothesis that larger countries benefit less from economic integration. Alesina et al. (2000) find a positive effect of both openness and country size on the economic development, the growth inducing impact of the market size being determined by the degree of openness.
22 The rising number of countries in the course of global integration since World War II seems to support this causality. Therefore, according to this view, economic integration increases the benefits of secession and reduces the advantage of large states.
Whereas this work applies to the extreme case of secession, the particular effect of economic integration on the vertical government structure has been hardly investigated empirically. Rodrik (1998) finds in a cross-sectional as well as in a panel setting of industrial and developing countries a positive significant effect of the degree of economic openness on the size of the public sector. However, this result holds especially for countries with high terms-of-trade risk, and less for OECD countries.
23 According to these findings, increasing exposure to exogenous shocks is mitigated especially by redistributive income transfers, welfare spending and other measures of macroeconomic stabilisation.
24 Since these functions are in the competency of the central government, one would therefore expect a centralizing effect of economic integration. Garrett and Rodden (2000) actually find support for this issue in a panel of industrial and development countries. They show that, in contrast to the literature on secession, trade integration and capital mobility are associated with a higher share of central government expenditures and revenues. This is explained by the demand for inter-regional risk-sharing and higher central government transfers aimed at preventing the secession of rich regions. In a related study, Hiscox (2001) shows that globalization changes the regional income distribution, thus affecting the benefits of decentralization.
The dynamic aspect of integration is partly taken into account by Verdier and Breen (2001) who provide least squares estimates of the impact of integration on the crosssectional change in the degree of fiscal centralization in 19 OECD countries. An increase in the degree of financial openness, as measured by the index of Quinn and Inclan (1997) , is found to be positively related to fiscal centralization. The interaction with European integration, as captured by the EU structural funds receipts, however, yields a negative effect. This is assumed to be due to the insurance function of the structural policy which partly substitutes for national income redistribution. However, the progress of European integration, and other possible determinants of centralization are not taken into account. Finally, van Houten (2001) provides no clear evidence for a stimulating effect of economic integration on the demands for regional autonomy in EU countries. Instead, socio-cultural factors, parties and party systems seem to play a decisive role.
All in all, previous empirical studies on economic integration fail to provide a comprehensive modelling of both cost and benefits of secession or decentralization, such as, e.g., heterogeneity, and of existing institutional rules. Moreover, dynamic and interactive aspects of both economic and political integration are insufficiently taken into account. Nevertheless, the existing literature provides some important insights and a startingpoint for the analysis of the impact of economic and political integration on the division of functions among layers of government.
In the following, we test the hypothesis that economic integration, and, even more, the political unification in Europe have fostered the decentralization of the public sector.
22 See also Spolaore and Wacziarg (2002) , as well as Wacziarg et al. (2002) for a survey of this work. 23 Rodrik (1997) even finds a negative sign for OECD countries, indicating that globalization reduces the ability of governments for welfare spending.
24 See Schulze and Ursprung (1999) for a critical review of the empirical literature on the impact of integration on public expenditures.
For that purpose, an empirical investigation is carried out which includes, apart from integration, also other possible determinants of the vertical government structure, such as inter-regional heterogeneity, economies of scale, institutions, and other control variables. By this, both differences in the cost and benefits of centralization, and possible interactions with integration are taken into account.
Empirical analysis
The empirical analysis of the impact of economic and political integration on the vertical division of government functions starts with a comparative-descriptive overview. Then, the theoretical suggestions are implemented into a simple empirical framework which is finally estimated.
Descriptive statistics
The empirical analysis covers 23 OECD countries, thus encompassing, apart from EU countries, other comparable developed industrial nations with democratic traditions. This enables us to control for the effect of democracy described in the literature and for other common features and to separate the specific aspect of political and regional integration in Europe from the more general aspect of integration in the world economy.
To provide an overall view of the process of fiscal decentralization, Tables 1 to 2 compare the degree of public sector centralization at the beginning of the 1970s and the end of the 1990s. The degree of centralization is measured by the share of central government expenditures (revenues) in total government expenditures (revenues), as reported by the IMF Government Finance Statistical Yearbook 25 , which despite of several shortcomings constitute simple quantifiable measures and have been used predominantly in previous empirical studies. 26 Social security has been removed from the central government sector in order to focus on government functions which could be decentralized according to the theory on fiscal federalism 27 and to separate the insurance effect of the central government described by Rodrik (1998) . The allocation of inter-governmental transfers both to the recipient and, alternatively, to the effecting level allows a more detailed look on the pattern of decentralization. In the first case, only direct central government spending (revenues) is taken into account, whereas the second case involves total central government spending net of received transfers.
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The fiscal figures indicate on average a trend towards decentralization in most of the OECD countries considered here, even if at different paces and with some exceptions. The most prominent examples are Belgium and Spain, whereas, e.g., the United Kingdom exhibits a process of centralization of the public sector. However, whereas in only half of the countries the share of direct expenditures of the central government has diminished, net expenditure figures indicate decentralization in 14 out of 20 countries. This means that, in general, central government transfers to lower levels of government probably tend to be substituted by expanded own financial resources. Indeed, a look at the revenue side confirms an even more pronounced process of decentralization. At the same time, all countries exhibit a higher degree of centralization of public revenues as compared to the expenditure side, which indicates that net vertical grants are positive. Furthermore, 25 OECD National Accounts also provide long time series, which, however, suffer from certain difficulties of calculation and missing current data.
26 For a critical discussion of the measurement of centralization see, e.g., Oates (1972) , Levin (1990), and OECD (1999) . 27 Analogously, defence expenditures could be excluded, too. However, for the moment, we leave this to future research. 28 Note that, in both cases double countings are thus eliminated. European Union countries are on average more centralized than other OECD countries. The process of decentralization is, even if to a lesser extent, confirmed when adding social security to the central government sector. According to the figures, the relative share of social security expenditures and revenues has increased considerably in most of the OECD countries.
To contrast the development of the public sector both to economic and European integration, Table 3 reports some figures on the degree of trade and financial openness, and on the share of trade with EU countries. Both the share of exports and imports in GDP, and the Quinn/Inclan-Index which reflects the degree of financial openness according to currency, capital and current account restrictions, have clearly increased in all OECD countries during the period of observation. Due to the establishment of the common market, economic opening has been on average more pronounced in EU member countries. In line with this, EU trade figures also indicate increasing integration among EU countries, the opposite being true with regard to the other countries. This shows at the same time that especially regionally deeply integrated countries have joined the EU.
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Finally, Table 4 depicts the dynamics of political integration in Europe. The share of EU expenditures as % of total GDP or as % of total expenditures of the member countries Note: total expenditure and lending minus repayments (total revenue and grants) of the central government, without EU payments in % of total public expenditure (revenue); see Table 1 for further details.
has doubled since the beginning of the 1970s. Hence, these findings seem to endorse the "Sandwich" theory of a diminishing role of national governments in the EU, at least in terms of expenditure and revenue figures.
Empirical implementation
The hypothesis of a decentralizing effect of economic and political integration is tested for the panel of 23 OECD countries within the period 1970-2000. The regression analysis relates public sector centralization to the degree of economic and European integration, and controls for further variables which explain the vertical division of government functions and the relative demand for certain public services. In general, reported changes in the share of central government expenditures (revenues) in total government expenditures (revenues) are either due to changes in the allocation of functions, or in the budget share of certain expenditure (revenue) categories.
In order to focus on the role of integration, the model is estimated with fixed country effects, which absorbe all time-invariant country-specific factors, such as area, institutions, traditions, or regional diversity. In doing so, we concentrate on the determinants which are assumed to change the cost and benefits of decentralization over time. Contrary to pooled estimations, by conditioning on the cross-section the fixed effects approach focuses on the time variation in the data. Moreover, it controls for characteristics which are unobserved or cannot be quantified 30 , thus solving simultaneity problems in the form of omitted-variable bias. In order to take indirect (non-linear) effects into account, interactions between integration and different time-invariant factors are additionally included. However, it should be noted that due to conditioning on the cross-sectional distribution of decentralization, fixed effects (within) estimations might yield different results as compared to an analysis which deals with cross-country differences.
Formally, the basic estimation equation is
Centr it denotes the share of central government expenditures (revenues) in total government expenditures (revenues) in country i in year t, as described above. Open it denotes a vector of variables representing the degree of integration of the individual country in the world economy over time. Among them, the share of exports and imports in GDP (T open it ), and, alternatively, the Quinn/Inclan-Index of financial openness (F open it ) are used. In order to capture both the impact of joining the European Union and the advance of political integration, a dummy variable for EU membership (EU it ) is interacted with the share of EU expenditures in total public expenditures of the member countries (Exp t ). Two more variables have been included, alternatively. First, the share of trade with EU countries in total foreign trade (Eutrad it ) is used as a measure of the extent of regional economic integration of the individual countries. Second, we construct a country-specific index of political integration with the EU (Euint it ) which reflects different stages of integration: from free-trade agreements, the establishment of the customs union, the European Economic Area, until the creation of the Economic and Monetary Union. By this, different degrees of involvement in EU policy-making of both member countries, such as Denmark or the UK, and non-EU countries, such as the EFTA countries, are taken into account.
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In order to isolate the effect of integration from other potential determinants of the vertical government structure as described by the theory on fiscal federalism in section 2, vectors of control variables have been included. Among them, we consider economies of scale and spillovers of public goods (Scale it ), inter-regional heterogeneity (Heter it ), and further explanatory variables (Diverse it ). A vector of time-invariant variables (F ix i ) containing especially institutions is interacted with the degree of economic, and alternatively, European integration. Finally, α i denotes country-specific averages.
As stated above, cost and benefits of the decentral provision of public goods depend on the extent of economies of scale and spillovers of public goods, and the degree of inter-regional heterogeneity. Corresponding to the empirical literature, the first aspect is captured by the size of the country in terms of population (P op it ), and the spatial allocation of the population, as measured by the degree of urbanization (U rb it ). The higher the size and the geographic concentration of population, the more likely economies of scale could be exploited at the regional or local level, thus increasing the benefits of decentralization. In addition to this, the cost of centralized information, administration, and decision-making are likely to increase in the size of the country. However, since in general these variables change only gradually over time, the dynamic effects are expected to be rather moderate and have to be interpreted with caution. Further time-invariant factors, such as area, or the number of constituent jurisdictions, which are expected to affect the extent of economies of scale and spillovers, are captured by the fixed country effects.
Except for Strumpf and Oberholzer-Gee (2002) who measure preferences directly, previous studies employed indices of ethno-linguistic fractionalization as proxies for the inter-jurisdictional heterogeneity of preferences, thus implicitly assuming that the ethnic structure is correlated with the spatial allocation of the population. 32 However, the geographical sorting of people with similar preferences constitutes the crucial precondition for the validity of the Decentralization Theorem. This aspect is partly taken into account in this study by interacting an index of ethno-linguistic fractionalization (F rac i ) with a 31 In general, see appendix for further information on the variables presented here. 32 See, e.g., Panizza (1999) , and Garrett and Rodden (2000) . dummy variable for the existence of regionally concentrated assertive minorities (Reg i ) 33 , which, among others, is based on the existence of regionalist parties as a possible indicator for regional assertiveness. However, such fractionalization indices have to be treated with caution, since they do not reflect differences between ethnic groups, and thus, the actual degree of preference heterogeneity appropriately. Note that this composite index is interacted with the degree of economic integration. In addition, the degree of regional disparity of per capita income (Regdisp it ) is taken into account, which allows us to control for changes in the degree of heterogeneity in the course of integration.
34 On the one hand, the degree of centralization is expected to decrease with heterogeneity. However, on the other hand, by controlling for regional economic disparity the centralizing effect of increasing demands for inter-regional redistribution is separated from other effects of economic integration.
The next set of factors consists of standard control variables depicting the demand for certain public goods. According to the famous Wagner (1876) and Popitz (1927) "laws", economic development and rising income lead to the expansion and centralization of the public sector. For example, higher demand for income redistribution and the establishment of generous welfare systems are expected to be related to higher income per-capita levels. Yet, empirical evidence shows that high-income countries are likely to be more decentralized. This is explained by higher real cost involved with the requirement for qualified administrative staff and the cost of political coordination and creation of local institutions.
35 In order to test for these effects, we include real GDP per-capita (Rgdpc it ) in our regressions. The regression analysis also takes temporary expenditure and revenue effects of business cycles into account by including the rate of growth of real per-capita income (Rgdpc−gr it ), and the rate of unemployment (U nemp it ). Furthermore, a dummy variable for national election years (Elect it ) captures possible electoral cycles. According to this, one would expect the central government to choose higher expenditures in the run-up and, respectively, higher taxes in the aftermath of elections.
The role of institutions is finally taken into account by interacting integration with time-invariant indicators depicting the decision-making process. First, we include a dummy variable for the existence of a second chamber of parliament with regionally elected or delegated representatives (Regparl i ) as a proxy for the degree of involvement of subnational governments in national legislation. This allows us to verify the commonpool-argument especially with regard to public revenues and to control for counteracting political effects of integration. Second, an index measuring the statutory provisions for the organization of national referenda (Ref i ) has been constructed in order to detect the decentralizing effect of direct democracy described in the literature.
In light of the previous theoretical discussion, we expect a negative effect of both economic and European integration on the degree of fiscal centralization. However, rising demand for inter-personal and inter-regional redistribution associated with increasing exposure to economic shocks and growing regional disparities, as well as central government transfers directed towards separatist regions could provoke an opposite effect. In 33 Just to give an example, for France or the USA relatively high degrees of fractionalization are reported. However, the different ethnic groups are dispersed throughout the country, and, furthermore, represent recently immigrated people without deeply rooted regional traditions. The comparison between the index of fractionalization used here and the regional dummy reports only a correlation coefficient of 0.578.
34 Note that, in general, regional indicators involve certain difficulties. First, in several countries regional boundaries are often changed for political or administrative reasons, thus questioning the exogeneity and integrity of administrative divisions, and distorting the degree of disparity measured. For example, certain EU countries, such as Ireland or Finland, have recently created new development regions without real fiscal autonomy, for reasons of adaptation to the requirements of EU structural funds policy. This is directly related to a second problem, namely that of comparing countries with powerful regional governments, with countries where regions merely represent planning or statistical areas of the central government.
35 See, e.g., Oates (1972) . However, as Kee (1977) found out, this aspect is more likely to reflect differences between industrial and developing countries. addition to that, the outcome should also crucially depend on the specific institutional framework.
Results
The results of the estimations are reported below, in the Tables 5 to 7. 36 The F tests indicate significant country effects in the data, Hausman specification tests reject specifications using random effects. Checks for collinearity and influential observations have been carried out, 35 detected outliers being removed from the estimations. Most of the outliers found are associated with statistical breaks and changes in the regional organization of some countries. In addition to this, a dummy variable for Germany after re-unification has been included, too. Due to lack of regional data, Iceland, Luxemburg and New Zealand are missing from the sample.
The estimates confirm the hypothesis of a negative impact of both economic and European integration on the degree of public sector centralization in OECD countries. The results are, in general, significant at the 0.01 level and robust to alternative specifications, outliers, and the measurement of centralization. Sensitivity analyses have been carried out, including and removing outliers, or restricting the sample to countries with a minimum of 10 observations. The significant coefficients of integration also did not change when dropping all or certain control variables from the regression. Finally, the variables used are in general found to explain between 28 and 59 per cent of the variation within groups.
According to the estimates, an increase in the actual degree of economic openness, as measured by the share of foreign trade in GDP, reduces the share of central government expenditures and revenues. This finding is confirmed only with respect to the expenditure side, when including alternatively the Quinn/Inclan-Index which reflects the degree of openness according to legal provisions. In general, the coefficients are strongest with regard to direct expenditures, indicating that integration has provoked either the extension of the range of subnational government functions, or a ceteris paribus relative reduction in direct central government activity.
The same applies to the role of European integration. An increase in both the degree of political and of regional trade integration exhibit a strong and significant decentralizing effect, especially with regard to direct expenditures. At first glance, the results confirm the "Sandwich" theory. The central level of government seems to have been driven back both by the process of European political unification, and by the increasing benefits of decentralization associated with economic integration. However, a causality between regional economic integration, and the transfer of political and fiscal powers to the EU level is also possible. Indeed, the simultaneous inclusion of both indicators reveals only a significant decentralizing effect of regional trade integration, whereas the political integration variable now becomes insignificant.
The results reported in the columns (5) to (7) also seem to confirm the theoretical considerations concerning the indirect effects of integration. However, the respective direct effect of integration now becomes insignificant, or is reversed, as in the case of European integration. Controlling for interactions, both political and trade integration with the EU entered alone reveal a centralizing effect on public spending. We have confirmation that the decentralizing impact of economic and European integration on public spending is strongest in countries with important regional ethno-linguistic heterogeneity.
37 Within Note: all regressions contain fixed country effects and the German re-unification dummy whose coefficients are not reported. Standard errors are in brackets. ***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. Note: see Table 5 .
this context, regional trade integration in Europe proves to have an even stronger impact than the overall degree of openness. The estimates also support the importance of institutional rules. As predicted by the theory, stronger legal embodiment of referenda exhibits a decentralizing effect on public spending in the context of both economic and political integration. However, with regard to direct revenues, only the interaction with trade openness proves significant. In contrast to this, we find evidence for a centralizing effect of integration on direct public expenditures in the presence of a regionally elected chamber of parliament. The effect is even stronger with regard to EU trade integration and is significant for both expenditures and revenues. Particularly in the European context, this seems to confirm the common-pool argument and the existence of political forces opposing fiscal competition. Overproportionate representation in national legislation enables especially poor regions to resist decentralization and fiscal competition, and to stimulate direct central government expenditures and transfers instead.
In line with this finding, the estimates report a strong and significant positive impact of regional disparity of per-capita income on the degree of both public sector expenditure and revenue centralization. The inclusion of the regional disparity variable turns out to improve considerably the goodness of fit of the regression. Since economic integration is assumed to increase cross-regional disparities, this provides strong evidence for a stimulating effect of integration on the demand for inter-regional redistribution. As for the other control variables, the results are less clear-cut. A strong significant decentralizing effect of increasing population is found for net expenditures and the revenue side, thus partly confirming the empirical literature. The results are the same when using alternatively the median population size of the regions as a proxy for potential economies of scale at the subnational level. On the contrary, increasing urbanization is associated with a higher share of central government net expenditures and direct revenues. The effect is even more accentuated when social security is taken into account. Apparently, this contrasts sharply with the theory and previous empirical results. However, previous studies have tested the economies of scale argument only with cross-sectional or pooled data. Furthermore, the magnitude of the estimated coefficients of urbanization should be interpreted with caution, since the time variation is in general low. The result probably indicates higher spillovers and increasing demand for social assistance and other central subsidies in the course of urban agglomeration. On the revenue side, a higher degree of urbanization could facilitate economies of scale in the pooling and central collection of tax revenues.
With regard to the economic development, we find evidence for a negative effect of rising per-capita income on the degree of centralization of direct expenditures. In contrast to this, the estimates including social security show that higher income is associated with increased provision of social assistance. These findings could indirectly be in line with the Meltzer-Richard hypothesis that an increase in mean income relative to the income of the decisive median voter increases the size of government. 38 As expected, unemployment also increases the share of central government expenditures, especially when including social security. Correspondingly, a negative sign for the revenue side corresponds to declining revenues of the central government in times of rising unemployment. Other variables controlling for economic growth and political cycles have proved insignificant. Apparently, business cycles affect the activity of both central and subnational governments in the same way, thus indicating similar expenditure and revenue elasticities of income of the different layers of government. Finally, the inclusion of a dummy variable detects a significant trend towards decentralization during the 1990s, which can probably be due to the end of the cold war, and the consequent reduction in central government spending for armament and security.
Summary and conclusions
The aim of this paper is to explore empirically the possible causal relationship between economic and political integration and the observed process of public sector decentralization, in particular in European Union countries. Based on the theory of fiscal federalism, the analysis draws on recent work on the secession of countries which has shown that economic integration increases the benefits of independence. These considerations are extended to include certain aspects provided by the new economic geography literature and to investigate the effect of both economic and political integration on the vertical allocation of government functions. It turns out that, by enhancing regional specialization, economic integration could have stimulated the process of fiscal decentralization. The process of political unification in Europe is also assumed to have diminished the role of national governments, while at the same time extending the scope of activity of local and regional governments.
Since integration is assumed to alter the cost and benefits of the decentral provision of public goods, the investigation takes a panel data approach, controlling for countryspecific technologies, preferences, and institutional rules. The hypothesis of a decentralizing effect of economic and European integration has been tested for a panel of OECD countries. Controlling for other determinants and including country fixed effects, the results indicate that economic integration has in fact significantly contributed to the observed decentralization of the public sector. This holds even more for European Union countries, where an increase in regional trade integration and in EU expenditures is found to reduce the share of central government expenditures and revenues. According to these findings, national governments seem to have come under pressure both from the supranational and the subnational levels of government. Moreover, the decentralizing impact of integration appears to be stronger in countries exhibiting high ethno-linguistic heterogeneity and important legal scope for direct democracy. In contrast to this, direct involvement of subnational governments in central decision-making is associated with more centralization. We also found that inter-regional income disparity significantly increases the share of central government expenditures and revenues, thus confirming the hypothesis of higher demand for cross-regional redistribution with rising exposure to economic shocks.
However, the empirical analysis suffers from certain limitations, such as the measurement of fiscal centralization and of the public sector activity in general. Expenditure and revenue figures only partly reflect legislative activities, political coordination among layers of government, and real decision-making powers of subnational levels of government, and tend to understate the actual role of the central government. The same applies to the European Union, which is especially vested with regulating and legislative powers and the coordination of activities. Future research should also deal with the problem of aggregation of different government functions. Since these represent different public goods, a disaggregated analysis would automatically take account of different spillovers and economies of scale and provide a better understanding of the factors determining the vertical government structure. Finally, as the inclusion of the trend variable indicates, the last decade should be examined more closely, in view of a possible effect of the end of the cold war. However, despite of these shortcomings, the approach taken in this paper permitted us to focus on the particular aspect of the interaction between economic integration and European unification on the one side, and the vertical organization of the public sector, on the other side, revealing a significant relationship between those two broad trends among OECD countries. 
Regressions including social security

